The Jesuits' Estates Bill

THE JESUITS’ ESTATES BILL. Speech of the Minister of Justice. The Position of the Government Defended in one of the Greatest Efforts of the Present Session. Sir John Thompson, on rising, was greeted with cheers. He said: I feel that in addressing the house upon this question and in presenting to it at this stage of the debate the reasons which I conceive justify the government in advising his Excellency not to withhold his assent from the bill, not to exercise the power of disallowance, I must ask more than the usual indulgence of the house. I shall be compelled in the first place to dwell at considerable length upon details which the house has already discussed at considerable length, and I shall have to speak under a sense of the fact that with one great portion of the community of Canada nothing that I can say will be satisfactory, and that to another and I hope the greater portion of the people of Canada, no defence of the government is necessary upon this question. Nevertheless, considering the arraignment which the policy of the government has had upon this question, considering the interest which the measure has excited in all quarters of Canada, it is only becoming that I should task the patience of the house, if need be, in order that I may make to the house a plain statement of the reasons which have induced us to give to his Excellency the advice for which we are being held responsible tonight. EXCEPTIONS TO MR. M’CARTHY. I desire, before beginning a statement of these reasons, to take exception to one remark which was made by the hon. gentleman from Simcoe at the outset of his address with reference to the position which we occupy in this debate. The hon. gentleman, in complaining that no member on the treasury benches had risen to take part in the debate down to this stage, complained of it almost as an act of discourtesy. He seemed to think that the mode in which the debate should be carried on was a mere matter of politeness and a more matter of fence. I do not so regard it. I understand the position of the case to be this: That the case on behalf of the amendment was presented forcibly and ably last night by the hon. gentleman from Muskoka, sustained by a gentleman on the opposite side of the house, but I leave for the sense of the house whether when the debate closed at near midnight last evening any argument remained unanswered which called for an answer from the treasury benches. (Cheers ) But with regard to the hon. member’s complaint on the ground of discourtesy, I have to appeal to the sense of fairness of the house in these terms: No member on either side of the house was unaware from the commencement of this debate that the main grounds on which the right of the government in this matter would be assailed would be presented by the hon. member for Simcoe. I was the minister who, if there be a difference between colleagues as to the extent to which responsibility is shared, was primarily responsible, and I submit it to the sense of fairness of every member of this house whether before stating the reasons upon which I must stand or fall as regards the correctness of the advice which I have given to his excellency, it was not my right to hear my accuser before I replied. (Cheers.) The hon. gentleman thinks otherwise, and the position which he takes is this, that courtesy to him and to the gentlemen who will divide with him tonight, requires that his arraignment of my report, his arraignment of the government with regard to every step of this transaction, should be made after my mouth was closed, and I ceased to have a right to defend myself. If there is any burner, or any courtesy in that position, I am willing to submit that I am wrong in reserving the remarks which I had to make with regard to my attitude on this question. Now, in presenting the case which I have to present ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT tonight, I must ask your attention for a few moments again to the wearisome narration of the position which these lands occupy in the province of Quebec. Not that that matter has not been discussed in every detail, but because in almost every detail I have essential differences of opinion from my hon. friend from Simcoe, and because in some respects the points on which this case depends were lost sight of by the hon. member in the admirable address which he made this afternoon. Why, sir, I venture to think, and I venture to say, without the slightest disrespect for the hon. gentlemen, for whose talents no one in this house has a higher respect than I have, for I would be the last person to disparage any observations which he might address to this house. I might venture to say that the reason why this house ought not to address his excellency now to disallow that act, was that the hon. member for Simcoe if we had no better reason, a master of legal argument, addressed the house for nearly three hours this afternoon, and presented a case upon which, to say the least of it, the greatest doubt must depend presented a case in which for one whole hour the hon. gentleman went from detail to detail, from step to step, for the purpose of proving what? For the purpose of proving that the Jesuits of Quebec have no legal title to these estates in question, a fact which is admitted in the preamble to the bill; spent an hour more in discussing theological questions and questions concocted with ecclesiastical history in England, which in England itself, and in every one of her colonies, has been sent to sleep for the last 200 years by THE SPIRIT OF TOLERATION on which alone a British country can be governed. (Cheers.) Now, let me call the attention of the house to a brief statement with regard to the position in which these estates stood, not for the purpose of showing that these people in the province of Quebec, whatever their character and merits may have been, had a legal title to this property, but for the purpose of showing that this is not a question which we can weigh, upon which we can divide, but which must and ought to be left in every one of the provinces to that authority which the constitution makes not only entitled to deal with such questions, but omnipotent in dealing with such questions, subject only to control in so far as the rights of the whole Dominion and the policy of the empire may be involved. Now the house will remember that long before the cession of Canada to the crown of Great Britain the Jesuits had labored in the wilderness, in the schools and in the churches of Canada, and that as a reward for their missionary zeal, for their talents as teachers and for their services to this, one of the great colonies of France, that order had been erected into an incorporated body under the most solemn acts which the king of France could pass under his hand—had been endowed with these estates by the king of France, and by private donors who wished to place in their hands the means by which the work of Christianity and civilization among the savages could be carried on; and by which the work of education among the youth of the province of Quebec could be conducted. These were the terms which they held their lands when the battle was fought on the Plains of Abraham and the conqueror took on under terms which are in the first place set forth in the capitulation of the city of Quebec, afterwards in the capitulation of the city of Montreal, under terms which are plainly defined by the law of nations recognized in every civilized country in the world. WHAT ARE THOSE TERMS by the law of nations, as I have said, recognized in every civilized country in the world? The conquering power took possession of all the rights, privileges and powers which the conquered monarch had in the country. He took possession of no more. He took the sovereignty of the country; he took the king’s fortifications in the country; he took the king’s stores of arms and ammunition in the country; he took the king’s lands and treasures in the country, but he was powerless by the law of nations to lay his hand upon the property, movable or immovable, of the humblest in the country, and if he had done otherwise it would have been an outrage on the law of nations which would have disgraced the British arms. He would have committed an act, let me tell the house, which, irrespective of the law of nations, the conquering general solemnly promised by the terms of the capitulation begun at Quebec and repeated at Montreal, would not do. Now, it has been said in the course of this debate that by the terms of capitulation the Jesuits of the province of Quebec and all their property were placed at the mercy of too conqueror. I do not so read the terms of capitulation. I do not so read my international law as to that being the right of the conqueror, but, laying aside altogether the question of what international law provided, let me read this article 34 of the terms of capitulation in Montreal: "All the communities"—and at that time the Jesuits were in communities in the province of Quebec—"and all the priests shall preserve their movables, the property and revenues of the seignories and other estates which they possessed in the colony of what nature soever they be, and the said estates shall be preserved in their privileges, rights, honors and exemptions." That was the request made, and what was the answer given? The answer unequivocally was, "Granted," and yet we are told "No," that these estates which came within the exact words of that provision as regards the property movable and immovable of the communities, priests and religious orders of the province of Quebec, were RESERVED FOR THE KING’S MERCY. It is true that the preceding section, 33,was declined until the king's pleasure be known, and in that there was distinct mention of the Jesuits, but that article related not to the property only of the Jesuits, but claimed that in addition to having their property preserved to them as was granted in the 34th section, they should have all their rights —that is, all their constitutions and privileges should be exempted from lodging any military, should not be allowed to be troubled in their religious exercises, that troops should not enter their monasteries, and that as regards the Jesuits they should preserve their rights to nominate certain curacies and missions as heretofore. Those privileges, vague and indefinite by that article, were left by the "Reserved till the king’s pleasure be known." But when it came to the question, "What shall be done with the property of these people?" the unequivocal answer was granted, that they should keep their property, as they had the right to keep it, under the laws of nations and under the laws of Great Britain, preserved by the conquering arms of England arrayed against the arms of France, but not arrayed against private Frenchmen or French women, religious or secular, in France or in Canada. (Cheers.) Now, sir, we go a step further, and we refer to THE TREATY OF PEACE. The war went on and the treaty was not made until 1763. I will read to the house a passage from the treaty because the terms of the capitulation are subject to be qualified by the definite terms of the treaty made at the close of the war. By the terms of the treaty a provision was made which stated that his French majesty cedes to Great Britain in full the right to Canada, with all its dependencies, its islands and coasts in the gulf and river St. Lawrence, everything which the crown of France held until that time, and that in the most ample manner performed without restriction and without any liberty to depart from the terms of such cession or to disturb Great Britain in possession. In return for that cession of Canada this solemn compact was made by his Britannic majesty by which, on his side, he decreed full liberty of the Catholic religion, and he was pledged to give the most precise and effectual orders that his new Roman Catholic subjects might profess the worship of their religion according to the rights of the Roman church as far as the laws of Great Britain permitted. He further agrees that they shall have leave to retire from New France and sell their properties, provided they sell them to British subjects. This house has been told that the essence of the whole clause of the treaty is in the qualification. "So far as the laws of Great Britain permit," and we are told that that of itself introduced all the laws of England into Canada relating to public worship, and including the supremacy act. Mr. McCarthy—Not by me. Sir John Thompson—The hon. gentleman did not mention the Supremacy Act in that connection, but the argument was introduced by another gentlemen who spoke, and we were told that this clause of the treaty introduced THE SUPREMACY ACT into Canada. Let me tell the house plainly that if the Supremacy Act had been in force in Quebec, no man could have exercised the Catholic religion at all. (Hear, hear.) The essence of the Supremacy Act, stripping the act of all its verbiage, giving its essence but quoting its exact words, the gist of the act is that no persons outside the realm of England shall have or exercise within the Queen's dominions even spiritual superiority. If no spiritual superiority in the province of Quebec, then no foreign priest. (Hear, hear.) Then no bishop in the province of Quebec. (Hear, hear.) No bishop in the province of Quebec, no priest in the province of Quebec. (Hear, hear.) No priest in the province of Quebec, no sacrament for the living or the dying in the province of Quebec, and every altar in Quebec would have been cast down by the very terms of a treaty by which his Britannic Majesty, in return for the cession of half a continent, solemly promised not only that they should have the right to exercise their religion, but had given the most precise orders that freedom of worship should he carried out in every respect. (Hear, hear.) Obviously the treaty meant no such thing, obviously his Britannic Majesty did not withdraw in one hand the cession of this country, and HOLD A FALSE PROMISE with the other. Obviously be meant there should be freedom of worship in Canada subject only to the legislation which might be made on this question from time to time by the parliament of Great Britain. Certainly not that they were to be subject to the laws respecting freedom of worship in Great Britain, for let me remind the house that instead of there being freedom of religion in Great Britain the exercise of the Catholic religion there amounted to the crime of high treason. (Hear, hear.) And no dissenter except without subjecting himself to imprisonment could enter a conventicle or meeting house. (Hear, hear.) Obviously it did not mean the laws of public worship in Great Britain or even the laws of supremacy. (Hear, hear.) The obvious meaning, was as quoted from the words of the attorney general and solicitor general in England and of the prime minister of England in discussing the treaty stipulation, what on its face every sensible and unprejudiced man will say its meaning was: That in so far as the laws of Great Britain permitted freedom of worship in her colonies, and the laws of Great Britain at that time did permit freedom of worship in the colonies, and in so far likewise the laws of Great Britain might permit it. We pass on then to the Quebec act of a few years later, of 1774, and I come now certainly to a branch of the argument against us which my hon. friend from Simcoe did press upon us this afternoon, namely, that by the express terms of that statute, the statute of Elizabeth with regard to the supremacy of the Queen, was enacted with regard to the province of Quebec. Now, let me remind him and let me press upon the house for the purpose of considering how far passion has guided and swerved the reason of some of those who have addressed us on that question. Let me ask the house to look at the statute, and they will find that the rights of the people of Quebec and FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP are as fully guaranteed by these terms of the Quebec act as by the treaty of Paris itself. While it is true that one provision of the statute, the statute made in the first year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, extended over all the country, and to the possessions of that realm applied to the province of Quebec; I repeat the argument again that that is subject to a limited construction, because if it is to be read in its literal sense it was the absolute prohibition of the practice of the Roman Catholic religion in the province of Quebec, under the penalties of high treason itself. But the act left no such ambiguity to mere construction, because it goes on to limit the operation of the statutes relating to the real supremacy by declaring that instead of the oath of abjuration, which, by the terms of the statute of first Elizabeth, all people professing the Catholic religion were required to take, in which they abjured all foreign jurisdiction in relation to temporal matters and spiritual matters as well, and virtually relieves Quebec from that old penal provision and provides a new form oath for the people of the province of Quebec, whereby they shall no longer be bound to abjure the foreign jurisdiction in matters spiritual, but shall be entitled to all the privileges of that statute and all possible privileges of worship on taking the oath of allegiance merely, which applies only to the temporal powers of the reigning sovereign. So that, instead of it being in any sense true that by the terms of the Quebec act the restrictions of the Supremacy act were imposed upon the province of Quebec, by the express terms of that act they were relieved from the most odious provision - the provision by which they were bound to swear against conscience and in abnegation of their faith, that they would recognize the power of no forein priest even in spiritual matters. So much for the act of 1774, by which I think I have shown that THERE WAS A TOLERATION EXTENDED in regard to the province of Quebec which did not exist in the mother country, and which was utterly inconsistent with those old statues, which forsooth, 115 years afterwards, we are asked to advise his excellency to apply to the province of Quebec. Now, sir, in 1791, which was twenty five or thirty years after the conquest of Canada, the king of Great Britain issued a proclamation suppressing the Order of Jesuits in the province of Quebec. As history has told us, the estates, which are even now in question, were looked upon with a covetous eye by one who had taken an active part in leading the armies of Great Britain. On that subject I need not go into details. His covetous attempt was frustrated, but, suffice it to say, that at this stage of the controversy the King of England, I submit it to the legal sense of the house, had not the power to revoke the terms of the charter of incorporation which the Jesuits of Canada had received from the King of France. The King of England succeeded under the laws of nations in this country the King of France. I admit that his parliament, the parliament of Great Britain, might have brought in the whole body of the common law; could have applied all the penalties to statutes which the bigotry of that age might have chosen to draw, but the King of England had no such prerogative. If the king himself draws a charter THE KING HIMSELF CANNOT REVOKE IT. Only parliament can. In this instance, by the attempt of the King to suppress that order and revoke the charter, he exceeded the authority which he possessed. We were told, however, that by a royal proclamation all the common law of England was introduced into Canada. I deny that most emphatically. By the law of nations, recognized at every stage and followed under English law, the laws of a conquered country prevailed until the paramount authority of the conquering country imposed new laws upon it. The monarch of the conquering country cannot of himself impose these laws; cannot of himself do it under the statutes of Great Britain, but if there cannot be a doubt upon that subject as to the general rule, I say this and I defy contradiction upon it. The King of England could not introduce the common law by his proclamation in violation of the treaty which he had made in 1763, and by the terms of the Treaty of Paris, in which he had reserved all those rights which touch this question, even in the remotest degree. And, therefore, it is idle for us to discuss how far he might have made other breaches of the common law applicable to this country. Now, in the year 1880 the last Jesuit died, and I think, that by the law of England applicable perhaps at that time to this property in Canada, on the death of the last surviving member of the corporation, the property escheated to the crown, and the crown could have taken possession of it. Afterwards steps were taken to assist this right on the part of the crown, but the question was complicated in the meantime by the fact that the Pope had suppressed the Company of Jesus all over the world, and by the terms of that suppression and by the terms of the civil law which it is contended still prevails in the province of Quebec, the property, instead of diverting to the crown, passed to the orders of the diocese in which they were situated. I do not say that is so. I present it as one of the questions which have been raised, and which have tended to make this question anything but a plain one. I will do more. I will admit the contention of my hon. friend from Simcoe that the common law had in the meantime been introduced and the civil law superseded by the terms of the common law, and that these estates had become escheated to the crown. ONE OF THE QUESTIONS which have been constantly agitated in the province of Quebec is this: If you were to submit this property to the common law, you must at least give us the benefit of the common law, which says that whenever property has been escheated to the crown, the crown is bound always to consider the persons who are morally entitled to it, and the use for which it was intended to be applied. They shall not become as an emolument to the crown, or be used for an augmentation of the revenue, but shall be appropriated to the intention of the donors or those who may be considered morally entitled to it. If that consideration were to prevail to any extent, the clergy, and it might be the Jesuits, who succeeded on the reinstatement of the order, would have some kind of moral right to compensation in respect of these estates, but let me call the attention of the house to this fact, which I think has been kept out of view, and which certainly the hon. member for Victoria, who addressed us last night, overlooked in his argument. When the properties were taken possession of, when they were eventually seized, it is not by the right of escheat at all, but declares that the right by which the crown intends to claim these properties is the right of conquest. A right which, as I have said before, is repudiated by the law of nations, was distinctly repudiated by the crown officers of Great Britain at the time, and in spite of all that has been said in this debate, has not had one word to be said for it, and that was the only title by which Great Britain claimed that she had a right to those estates. Now, it is true, likewise, that subsequent statutes vested in the province of Quebec, that subsequent statutes vested in the province of Canada, and ultimately, in due course of law, and as the result of the statutory title, these lands have become vested in the province of Quebec. As to the conclusion which my hon. friend from Simcoe reached that, therefore, the province has a good title to them—a perfect title, a legal title—I have not one word to say, and if this bill had come before us claiming all that has been done by the provincial legislature under the disputed act was done in recognition of the legal title, I should have felt bound to call the attention of my colleagues to the fact that a very great mistake had been committed, on which it would have been necessary to advise the legislature to reconsider their conclusions. But it has been admitted by the province of Quebec that A GOOD TITLE EXISTED in the province, and all that is said on the face of this bill, or in this act, or in the argument in support of it, is this: That there existed a moral claim to some degree of compensation, little or much, which to a greater or less extent was binding upon the conscience of the legislature of that province. Now, the result of the existence of that claim, the result of the agitation of that moral right, whatever it may have been, perhaps worthless in our estimation, perhaps worthless in mine, was that from year to year as the province went on to assert its rights to those estates, and as the province claimed to put piece after piece of it in the market, the province was met by the united protest of the hierarchy of Quebec, demanding that those properties should not be sold, should not be diverted from the original charitable and religious purposes for which they were intended, and every step by which those estates were sought to be made useful to the revenues of the province was contested in the most formal and solemn manner. It is recited in part of the preamble to this act that not many years ago one of the most valuable pieces of property, being situated opposite the cathedral in the city of Quebec was brought to market, and in the market was met by the solemn protest of all the hierarchy of the province of Quebec, and in the face of that protest, casting as it did A CLOUD UPON THE TITLE of the province, involving as it seemed to do a dispute as to the right of the province and as to the conscience of the province, these estates and that property had to be withdrawn from the market. Now let me assure the house again that in presenting this case to hon. gentlemen I am endeavoring to do so, not from my individual point of view at all, but simply from the point of view on which we may be asked to withhold or give advice with respect to the great power of disallowance of the provincial statute. Let me call the attention of the house to all those details, and let me ask the house to keep in mind that statute with regard to the property itself, with regard to the assertion of this moral right, worth little or much, of the difficulties of marketing the property in the province of Quebec under those circumstances, and if the house will do so, and will bear in mind the various steps relating to that property, and then will read with me the statute which we are asked to disallow, I say that the provisions of that statute will cease to be obnoxious to any reasonable man, not be misunderstood, and can hardly be misrepresented, even by the most violent prejudice. Under those circumstances the sale was forbidden. I am not driven at all to defend the policy of the government of the province of Quebec as to the propriety of opening that question, as to the propriety of not insisting that those properties should be sold, even if they should be sacrificed in the face of that formidable protest. It was for the legislature of Quebec to say, as the constitution has charged me with no duties, and with no responsibilities as to the moral or legal right of the provincial legislature, to consider the weight of any legal or of any moral claim. I might concur with gentlemen who have spoken this afternoon that it was unwise not to INSIST ON THE STRICT RIGOR OF THE STATUTORY TITLE based on confiscation, severe though it may have been. But in this matter the constitution has not made me the judge, above all, has not made me the judge between the different classes of the province of Quebec; it has not made my colleagues the mediators between the different sects of people in the province of Quebec. It is not intended to clothe his excellency with the power to step in and consider every question which arises between the people of the provinces. It is vested with authority in the provincial legislature, which, by a unanimous vote, as has been pointed out by the hon. gentleman from Northumberland last night, declared that this was the true and proper solution of the question. Under these circumstances, have I any right to exercise a superior and over-ruling judgment for the province? Is that the theory upon which our constitution is to be worked out? This moral claim, as they chose to call it, may have been as weak as air, but it was strong according to the conscience and the judgment of those whom the constitution solemnly appointed to decide, and in that matter it is not for us to say, Did the province arrive at a right conclusion or a wrong one? I cannot state the matter any more forcibly than in the very words of one of our opponents upon this question, who declares that "the authority given to the provincial legislature over certain classes of subjects carried with it the law of authority and liberty of error, which must be respected so long as the legal power is not manifestly subversive, legally or morally, of the business of the state." As far, therefore, as we are able to consider the legal right and the fairness of the province of Quebec to consider a moral obligation, leaving out of sight for a moment the other question, THE THEOLOGICAL QUESTION which the bon. gentleman from Simcoe and I are to discuss in the face of the house, with a view of the house passing a judgment upon us as to which is the better theologian, and as to whose advice on a question of theology his excellency the governor general as the supreme theologian—(laughter) —is to act. Leaving out of sight these questions, for the time being, I say that the advice which we have given to his excellency is sustained by the fact that, on these questions, while we are not perfectly free from doubt as to the moral claim, the legislature of the province of Quebec is the supreme authority to decide, and had a perfect right to decide, and decide without veto or control of the authority here, even though we thought they decided erroneously. Now, sir, having asked the house to bear in mind the situation in which these properties stood in the province of Quebec, the way in which they were brought to market, when they were met by this protest, which completely frustrated the same, let me call the attention of the house to ANOTHER STATE OF AFFAIRS as regards the various claims upon this property in the province of Quebec. There were the bishops of the province, who set up the claim, and the result of the suppression of the Order of Jesus in this province vested in them the estates and various properties situated therein. They claimed that they inherited their moral claim because the means ware taken from their hands of carrying on missionary work and the work of education, which they took up at sacrifices of the people’s means. They claimed building up institutions of education all over this country. The Order of Jesuits in the meantime had been reinstated and reorganized in the province, and just upon this point let me refer to the argument of my hon. friend from Simcoe, which was that by the decree of suppression in France the order became extinct in Canada. He cited for that the decision of the parliament of Paris, which merely decided that the Jesuits in France were liable for the debts of the Jesuits of Paraguay, because the profits of the two sets of men were consolidated. That has not the remotest effect upon the Jesuits in Canada, who themselves were incorporated by the most solemn instrument which the King of France could pass. I have mentioned the fact that the bishops of the province claimed that they stood representing the moral right which the legislature thought was worthy of compensation. The Jesuits claimed that likewise. Look at this matter as a business matter. Look at this matter as relating to a piece of property situated in the province of Quebec, and tell me under these circumstances how the title was ever to be made clear to this dispute. Obviously not by compensating first one party and then the other, because under these circumstances the legislature would have had to pay twice for the moral claim. It could be only be settled by GETTING THE TWO PARTIES TO ARBITRATE and settle by mutual arbitration, and to do that you must leave it to the fair decision of one who has authority over you both. (Hear, hear.) Let us argue this question throughout, without feeling that we belonged to different religious persuasions, and that no religious question is mixed up in it at all, and not use defensive names to excite the prejudices of some portion of this community. It so happened that the heirarchy of Quebec, the two contesting parties who were struggling for compensation for this moral claim, were both members of the same church, and both, by their membership of that church, recognized the supreme authority in the head of that church to settle their disputes, even against their will—(hear,hear)—not by any constitutional provision of the province of Quebec, mind, not by any provision recognized in any English law, mind, but by consent of these parties who were free to belong to that church and free to leave it, but while they did belong to it were subject to the supreme authority of the head of that church. He had the power by their choice, by the principle, not by any statute of the province of Quebec, not by any constitutional provision of the province or anywhere else; by their choice as long as they believe in his church he had the right to say how this should be settled between them, and how much should go to one and how much to the other, no matter how small or large the proportion, but they must submit. He would say you must submit, it is a fair settlement between you, and I, as your supreme arbitrator, can bind you by my decision. The province of Quebec, therefore, haring made up its mind to recognize the moral claim, if for no other purpose than for the purpose of public policy, finding they could not arrive at a solution of the question without having some person who was clothed by consent of these two parties with power to go between them and define the proportion for both, it was only by a move like that that they could reach a solution by paying once, and once only, the value of this moral claim. Now, that being so, let me see what was done in pursuance of THAT METHOD OF SETTLEMENT. The head of that church is possessed of the power of precluding the Jesuits from making any further claim. In 1884 the Archbishop of Quebec was empowered to act as the Pope's attorney in negotiations for the settlement. On the 7th May, 1887, a document appears which has done the most to excite the hostility to this act. On the 7th May, 1887, the head of that church reserved to himself the right to settle that question with regard to the value of that moral claim and the division of the property. Reserving it to himself in virtue his prerogative as popentate? Not at all. Reserving it to himself simply after the withdrawal of the authority which he had given to the Archbishop of Quebec and leaving himself unrepresented in the province of Quebec by any attorney whatever, and therefore when it is said that reserved to himself the right to settle the question he was not by any means claiming the rights in the public domain of Quebec. He was simply withdrawing the authority which he had given to another person to settle and saying, "Until new authority is given you will negotiate with me." (To be continued.)